ࡱ> TWQRSO j(bjbj7v7v C*UeUeA (jj8 dNh"ps"""""p#&$<b$ }NNNNNNN$fRUrN$p#p#$$N""N***$""}N*$}N**:/,/"kt'/ iNN0N/ U^)U//UU8*$$$NN:*$$$N$$$$U$$$$$$$$$j u: January 20, 2020 Curriculum Vitae David B. Hershenov Department of Philosophy 135 Park Hall Ҵý Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 Email: dh25@buffalo.edu Work Phone (716) 645-0150 Cell Phone (716) 698-9618 Web page  HYPERLINK "http://davidhershenov.com" http://davidhershenov.com Educational Record Ph.D. Ҵý of California at Santa Barbara. 2002 Thesis: A Defense of the Biological Account of Personal Identity Committee Members: Nathan Salmon (Chair), Tony Brueckner, and Anthony Anderson M.A. Analytic Philosophy, New York Ҵý. 1996 Thesis: Personal Identity and Spatial Coincidence Supervisor: Peter Unger M.A. Continental Philosophy, New School for Social Research. 1994 Thesis. Legal Skepticism and Dworkins Jurisprudence Supervisor: Agnes Heller B.A. Ҵý of California, Berkeley. 1985 Independent major in Twentieth Century European Political Theory Awards Professor of the Year 2015-2016. Bestowed by the Ҵý Philosophy Department. Graduate Students. Professor of the Year 2012-2013. Bestowed by the Ҵý Philosophy Department Graduate Students. Individual Development Award from the State of New York/United Ҵý Professions 2008. Ҵý Young Investigator Award 2004 Stough Award for best essay in ethics by a graduate student - Ҵý of California at Santa Barbara 1997-1998 Siff Award for best essay in philosophy by a graduate student - Ҵý of California at Santa Barbara 1999-2000 Wienphal Award for Graduate Student Teaching Excellence Ҵý of California at Santa Barbara 2001-2002 Employment Co-Director of Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine 2016 to Present Full Professor of Philosophy: Ҵý Fall 2010 to present Associate Professor of Philosophy: Ҵý, Fall 2007 to 2010 Assistant Professor of Philosophy: Ҵý, Fall 2002 to Spring 2007 Areas of Specialization Metaphysics, Medical Ethics, Normative Ethics Areas of Competence Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of Law Articles copies available on line at http://davidhershenov.com 1. The Limits of Liberal Tolerance: The Rights of Gays and Lesbians to Adopt, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 9:2, 1995, 27-34. 2. Restitution and Revenge, Journal of Philosophy, 96:2, 1999, 79-94. 3. The Problem of Potentiality, Public Affairs Quarterly, 13: 3, 1999, 255-271. 4. An Argument for Limited Human Cloning, Public Affairs Quarterly, 14: 3, 2000, 245-258. 4b. An Argument for Limited Human Cloning, Reprinted in Whats Wrong? Applied Ethicists and their Critics ed. David Boonin and Graham Odie. Oxford Ҵý Press. 2004, 688-693. 5. Punishing Attempted Crimes Less Severely than Successes, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 34, 2000, 479-489. 6. Abortions and Distortions: An Analysis of Morally Irrelevant Factors in Thomsons Violinist Thought Experiment, Social Theory and Practice, 27:1, 2001, 129-148. 7. Why Must Punishment be Unusual as Well as Cruel to be Unconstitutional? Public Affairs Quarterly, 16:1, 2002, 77-98. 8. A Puzzle about the Demands of Morality, Philosophical Studies, 107, March 2002, 275-290. 9. Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection, Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 38, 2002, 451-469. 9b. Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection translated into Russian by Vladmir Shokhin and reprinted in the Philosophy of Religion: An Almanac. Forthcoming 10. The Thesis of Vague Objects and Ungers Problem of the Many, Philosophical Papers. 30:1, March 2001, 47-57. 11. Scattered Artifacts, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 40:2, 2002, 211-216. 12. Olsons Embryo Problem, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80:4, 2002, 502-511. 13. The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection. Faith and Philosophy. 20:1, January, 2003, 24-36. 14. The Problematic Role of Irreversibility in the Definition of Death, Bioethics, 17:1, February 2003, 89-100. 15. Can there be Spatially Coincident Entities of the Same Kind?, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 31:1, March 2003, 1-22. 16. Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity, Philosophy, 79, 2004, 445-472. 17. Two Epistemic Arguments for Deliberative Democracy, Polity: The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association, 37:2, April 2005, 216-234. 18. How a Hylomorphic Metaphysics Constrains the Abortion Debate, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 5:4. 2005, 751-764. 19. Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms, Theoria, 71:1, 2005, 29-37 20. The Memory Criterion of Identity and the Problem of Backward Causation, International Philosophical Quarterly, 47:2:186, 2007, 181-85. 21. Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for the Biological Account of Identity? Mind, 114:453, January 2005, 31-59. 22. A More Palatable Epicureanism Proceedings of the Creighton Club. 152nd Meeting of the New York State Philosophical Association. November 4, 2006, 1-12. 23. Hylomorphic Concerns: A Reply to Eberls Criticisms, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 6:1 Spring 2006. 10-12. 24. Fission and Confusion, Christian Bioethics, 12:3, December 2006, 237-254. 25. Explaining the Psychological Appeal of Viability as a Cutoff Point, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. 6:4, Winter 2006, 681-686. 26. Personal Identity and Purgatory, Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 42, December, 2006, 439-451. 27. The Death of a Person, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 31:1. 2006, 107-20 28. Shoemakers Problem of Too Many Thinkers, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 80, 2007, 225-36. 29. Death, Dignity and Degradation, Public Affairs Quarterly, 21:1 2007, 21-36. 30. Lowes Defense of Constitution and the Principle of Weak Extensionality, Ratio, 21:2 2008, 168-181 31. A More Palatable Epicureanism, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 2, April 2007, 171-180. 32. Misunderstanding the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. 8:2, Summer 2008. 33. Organisms, Persons and Bioethics. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine. 8:1, Fall 2008, 8-11. Slightly different version published in Proceedings of the Creighton Society. 2008. 34. A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 82:3. 2008. 481-502. 35. Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons, Dialogue. 48:2. 2009, 291-312. 36. Why Consent may not be Needed for Organ Procurement, (with Jim Delaney). Target Article. American Journal of Bioethics. 9:8, 2009, 3-10. 37. Response to Seven Critics (with Jim Delaney) American Journal of Bioethics. 9:8, 2009. 38. The Im Personally Opposed to Abortion But Argument. American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings, 82 2009. May 2010. 77-87. 39. Restitution and Punishment in Punishment and Ethics: New Perspectives eds. Jesper Ryberg, Angelo Corlett Palmgrave MacMillan Press. 2010. 33-51. 40. Soulless Organisms? Animalism vs. Hylomorphism. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 85:3, 2011 465-482. 41. Mandatory Autopsies and Organ Conscription. with Jim Delaney Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. 19:4, 2009. 367-391. 42. Organisms and their Bodies, Mind. 2009, 118:70. 803-809. 43. The Metaphysical Basis for a Liberal Organ Procurement Policy. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics. 34:10, 2010, 303-315. 44. Identity Matters in The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. ed. Manson, N. and Barnard, R. Continuum International Publishing Group. 2010. 33-51. 45. Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism and Moral Status in Persons, Moral Worth and Embryos: A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments from Philosophy, Law and Science. Ed. Steve Napier. Philadelphia: National Catholic Bioethics Center. 2011. 125-144. 46. Perdure and Murder American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine. 2011. 11:1, 18-22. 47. Who Doesnt Have a Too Many Thinkers Problem? American Philosophical Quarterly. 50:2, 2013. 203-208. 48. Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity Akiba and Abasnezhad eds. Vague Objects and Vague Identity. Springer Press. 2014. 283-303. 49. Split Brains: No Headache for Soul Theorists. With Adam Taylor. Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 2014. 487-503. 50. Freedom and Identity with Adam Taylor. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3:1. 2015. 383-391 51. Morally Relevant Potential with Rose Hershenov. Journal of Medical Ethics, 41:3. 2015, 268-271. 52. Anscombe on Embryos and Human Beings in Anscombe and The Catholic Intellectual Tradition. Neumann Press. Eds. John Mizzoni, Philip Pegan, Geoffrey Karabin. 2016. pp. 143-160. 53. The Potential of Potentiality Arguments with Rose Hershenov in 2015 Proceedings of the Creighton Club. 54. Prussian Reproduction, Proper Function, and Infertile Marriages Annals of Philosophy. Special Issue on Alex Prusss One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics, with response by Pruss. 63:3, 2015, 128-141. 55. Death and Dignity. Anscombe Forum: Human Dignity. Edited by John Mizzoni. Aston, Pa. Neumann Ҵý Press. 2016. 93-116 56. Health, Harm and Potential with Rose Hershenov. Southwest Philosophy Review, 32:1, 2016, 189-196. 57. Death, Dignity, and Moral Status Proceedings of the 2016 Ҵý Faculty for Life Annual. Ed Fr. Koterski. 119-142. 58 Dualism, Panpsychism, and the Moral Status of Brainless Embryos with Adam Taylor. Ethics, Medicine and Public Health. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics. 2:4, 2016, 593 601. 59. Can Ordinary Materialists be Autonomous? with Adam Taylor. Philosophia Christi. 18:2, 2016, 385-405 60. Four-Dimensional Animalism in Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, eds. Paul Snowdon and Stephan Blatti. Oxford Ҵý Press. 2016, 208-226. 62. The Potential of Potentiality Arguments with Rose Hershenov in J. Eberl Ed. Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics. Springer Press. 2017, 35-52. 63. Ten (Bad, But Popular) Arguments for Abortion. Public Discourse. August 23, 2017. http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/08/19718/ 64. Purgatory with Rose Hershenov. Eds Benjamin Matheson and Yujin Nagasana. Palgrave McMillan Handbook on the Afterlife. 2017. 215-233. 65. If Abortion then Infanticide with Rose Hershenov. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 38:5, 2017, 387- 409. 66. Health, Interests, and Equality with Rose Hershenov, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 38:5, 2017, 417-419. 67. Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy with Adam Taylor. Dialectica. 2017, 71: 2. 155179. 68. Health as the Key to Fairness in a Divinely Determined World. Religious Studies. 32:4, 2018, 430-436. 69. "Self-Ownership, Relational Dignity, and Organ Sales" Bioethics. 32, 2018, 430-436 70. Health, Moral Status, and a Minimal Speciesism Res Philosophica. 2018, 95:4. 681-706 71. If Fetuses are Parts of their Mothers, Then Three Popular Abortion Defenses Fail. 2018.Life and Learning XVIII, Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Faculty for Life Conference. 72. The Fairness of Hell. 2019. Ratio. 32: 215223. 73. Why Transhumanists cannot Survive the Death of their Bodies 2019. Ethics, Medicine, and Public Health. Special Issue on Personhood and Science in the 21st Century. 10, July-September 102-110. 74. How Not to Defend the Unborn with Phil Reed, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Forthcoming 74b. How Not to Defend the Unborn reprinted in Life and Learning, Proceedings of the Faculty for Life Conference. Forthcoming. 75. Conscientious Objection or an Internal Morality of Medicine? Christian Bioethics. Forthcoming 76. Why Psychological Accounts of Personal Identity Can Accept a Brain Death Criterion and Biological Definition of Death Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 2019. 40:5. 403418 77. Pathocentric Medicine and a Moderate Internal Morality of Medicine. 2020, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 45: 1, 1627. 78. The Possibility of an Afterlife with Rose Hershenov. Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying: Classical and Contemporary Controversies. Eds. Travis Timmerman and Michael Cholbi. Routledge. Forthcoming 79. A Naturalist Response to Kingmas Critique of Naturalism Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. Forthcoming. 80. Evaluating Hylomorphism as a Hybrid Account of Personal Identity Quaestiones Disputatae. Forthcoming. 81. An Alternative to the Pro-Life Rational Substance View Res Philosophica. Special issue on Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine. Forthcoming 82. What Must a Pro-Lifer Believe about the Moral Status of the Embryo? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Forthcoming. 82b. Reprinted with the title Do Pro-Lifers Believe what they Claim to Believe? Life and Learning, Proceedings of the Faculty for Life Conference. Forthcoming Invited Book Reviews/Critical Notices 1. Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Souls by Nancy Murphy - Religious Studies, 43:2 2007, 237-242. 2. Thomistic Principles and Bioethics by Jason Eberl National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. 8:1 Spring 2008, 190-194. 3. Human Identity and Bioethics by David Degrazia National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 8:4 Winter 2008, 790-793. Submissions: Revise and Resubmit (MSS available upon request) Death and Dignity. Article on Velleman and Dworkins Dignity based Accounts to hasten death. Resubmission requested by Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: Ronald Dworkin and David Velleman fail in their attempts to justify hastening the death of patients on the grounds that their dignity demands their demise. I argue that not only do their projects fail internally for the dignity and interests that theyre trying to protect cant do the lethal work they want them to do, but their conceptions of dignity cant even provide reasons why we should cure the extremely demented who are reduced to childlike or comatose states. I argue instead for an account of dignity more in line with the tradition that our value depends upon the kind of entity we are and thus what ends we ought to realize. Our moral status will be determined by kind of life we can live if were healthy and functioning properly rather than be dependent upon our present or earlier manifestation of autonomy, rationality and personhood. Some Conceptual Problems for the Mere Difference Account of Disability. Resubmission requested by the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Many disability activists maintain that disabilities are mere-differences like race and sex, which dont lower well-being in the absence of discrimination. Concentrating on Elizabeth Barness account, Ill present conceptual problems for the mere-difference view of disability posed by naturalist conceptions of health. Such accounts identify disorder with dysfunction defined roughly in terms of suboptimal contribution to survival in the species design environment. Since disabilities involve disorders defined as making survival less likely, this virtually guarantees uncompensated losses of well-being and thus undermines the mere-difference view. Moreover, if disorders are understood as malfunctions in the species design environment, they can be removed and thus cured by changing the body or the environment. So the goal of the mere-difference approach to change the environment is itself a form of a cure which makes it harder for the disability movement to defend environmental rather than bodily interventions to help disabled children. Protecting Persons from Animal Bites Resubmission Requested by Philosophia I defend Bakers constitution theory against some animalist attacks. Defenders of psychological views of identity maintain that we are essentially thinking beings. Their animalist rivals insist that we are essentially living beings and thought is but a contingent trait of ours. The capacity to think is not ontologically significant. While my sympathies are with the animalist, what I mostly want to do here is defend psychological views of persons against some bites of my fellow animalists. I dont think they break the skin and draw any blood. My contention is that there are not any good arguments for why mental capacities cant be ontologically significant despite the claims of my fellow animalists, Olson in particular. i) I will first reject the claim that Person cant be a substance term but is instead a mere function term like locomotor while animal, on the other hand, is a substance kind term that can provide an answer to the question What is it (fundamentally)? Ironically, it turns out that organism itself a functional term. ii) Then I will consider and rebut the charge that even if some functional kinds are also substantial kinds, person is like locomotor, the wrong kind of functional kind to also be a substantial kind. iii) Next I will show that there is little merit to the claim that there is no principled answer about when constitution takes place as opposed to an already existing object just acquiring new properties. iv) Finally, I will show that there is little substance to the related charge that there is no principled answer to what parts of the animal constitutes the person. Do Division Puzzles Provide a Reason to Doubt that your Organism was ever a Zygote? Resubmission Requested by National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly Our contention is that the typical adult human organism was once a zygote. We claim that the five most compelling arguments against adult human organisms having ever been zygotes fail. All of the arguments have to do with one variant or another of the zygote or early embryo actually dividing or being capable of dividing in the first two weeks after fertilization. The first claims that zygotes, like other cells, go out of existence when they divide. The second claims that our organism couldnt have come into existence until there was a multicellular embryo whose cells were so integrated that twinning could no longer occur. The third objection to our organism having been a zygote is that there is no reason to believe it is identical to the embryo proper or extra embryonic placenta and membranes as they both arise from the early embryo. The fourth objection is that those of us who arent a twin are still a sum of parts that could have separated and produce twins making us identical to a sum that consists of two twins. The fifth objection arises from an early embryo surviving a reduction in size to either of its two halves due to the other half being destroyed. But if neither half was destroyed but both were removed and replanted, the worry is the same embryo would be identical to different organisms in different worlds. Thinking Animals or Thinking Brains? Resubmission Requested by Acta Analytica Animalism is more attractive than the Embodied Mind View. If people are not animals, but small proper parts of animals, then heres a threat of spatially coincident thinkers. This can only be avoided at the cost of the sparsest of ontologies, one in which there are no larger entities that can become reduced to the size of the brain or cerebrum-size thinker. This will be a rather implausible ontology as such thinkers wont fit well into the natural world, meet traditional independence or unity criteria for being substances, nor provide a compositional principle with causal glue. The intuitive support that cerebrum transplants and dicephalic twins provide for identifying ourselves with our brain parts is less than the advocates of Embedded Mind View claims. Not only can alternative thought experiments elicit intuitions to the contrary, the Embodied Mind View runs afoul on the only x and y rule in fission cases, while Animalism does not. Articles Under Submission (MSS available upon request) Is Health the Key to Autonomy? Sarah Buss claims that autonomy is grounded in the healthy functioning that passively causes our intentions and actions rather than to be found in appeals to idealized conceptions of agency. She advocates a True Self and claims that: We are more truly ourselves when we are not afflicted with an illness or disability and it is this normative aspect of our identity - our identity as a representative member of our species that is the key to the special since in which autonomous agents determine their own actions. My goal is to replace Busss unhelpful talk about a true self and personal identity and species identity with a helpful account based upon our nature as organisms that renders diseases foreign and actions autonomous. The Moment that You Die and Go Out of Existence. I assume that you are identical to a human animal and then argue that there is a precise moment at which you not only die but cease to exist. I will defend in the first half of my talk the so-called Terminator Thesis that the human body doesnt continue to persist after death as a corpse but goes out of existence and leaves behind remains that dont compose anything. The second part of my presentation will argue that there are logical and mereological grounds to maintain that there must be a precise moment at which the body dies and thus ceases to exist. A hypothetical scenario where more and more parts of a person are being replaced brings the threat of vague identity between the original and resulting replacement person. This vague identity can be avoided only if there is a precise amount of parts that one must retain to continue to exist. So the loss of just one more cell could extinguish someone. Thus I will defend an epistemicist account of vagueness on the grounds that if parthood and existence were vague (in a worldly, de re sense) then identity would also be vague. Since the latter is impossible, then there cant be scenarios where it is vague, i.e., there is no fact of the matter about someones continued existence and the parts that they possess. I will then conclude the lecture with some brief reflections upon the moral significance of my claims. I will contend that people cannot justifiably hold certain views about the dignity of the dead, organ procurement as a violation of bodily integrity, and the ownership and sale of bodies and their parts. Three Mistakes about Personal Identity and Harm to Embryos. There are three mistakes frequently made concerning how personal identity bears upon the issue of harm to embryos. One is the view that the identity of a mindless human embryo and a human person is a necessary condition for abortion being a great harm to that embryo. A second is that the identity of a mindless entity and a human person is a sufficient condition for that entitys destruction being a great harm to that entity. A third error is due to Parfits criterion for identity that leads to his famous claim that the identity doesnt matter, only psychological ties do. A consequence is that the identity of a mindless embryo and the later human person is irrelevant since mindless embryos cant be harmed. I will explain why these three beliefs are wrong and suggest a refocus of the abortion debate upon issues not so tied to personal identity. Harming the Mindless and Minimally Minded: Modifying McMahans Time-Relative Interests Account Jeff McMahans Time-Relative-Interests Account (TRIA) entails that the harm of an event isnt fully accounted for by a comparison of the higher well-being the person would have accrued in the absence of the event to the lower well-being resulting from it. Instead, the determination of the harm of an event also depends upon the degree of psychological ties that the person then has to the future goods that it prevents. The upshot is that those human beings with minimal minds cant be harmed greatly as they have few psychological ties to their future while those who have never been conscious cant be harmed at all since they then have no psychological ties to any future goods of which they will be deprived. Infanticide, abortion at any developmental stage, and causing mental impairments so severe that the disabled cant ever regret them are three of a number of the TRIAs counterintuitive consequences. These can all be avoided by expanding the notion of interests to include interests in currently undergoing healthy developments that enable individuals to later partake of goods with which they are presently unconcerned. Although the modified TRIA expands the morally relevant interests, it still allows that the harm of death is greater for the pregnant than the gestated as the former also have conscious interests frustrated by death. The Coherence of the Merely Personally Opposed Objection to Abortion Is it coherent to be personally opposed but accepting of the abortions of others? Can proponents of such a position consistently hold it given their other beliefs? At first glance, it is hard to comprehend how this could be as formal generalization principles are based upon treating like cases alike. However, the difference could lie not in the different moral status of the fetuses that are aborted or not, but in the different situations and attitudes of the pregnant women. Our conclusion will be that that while a few people with idiosyncratic metaethical and normative beliefs might be able to consistently hold the Im personally opposed but abortion position, the vast majority of those claiming to be merely personally opposed cannot coherently sustain that position. We believe that the latter are not only committed to condemning the abortions of others and have the moral standing to do so, but more importantly and controversially, are committed to call for a legal ban on abortion rather than restrict themselves to being merely personally opposed to abortion. Identity, Integration, and Transitivity: A Puzzle about the Existence of the Early Embryo It might seem that a human embryo in the first two weeks post-fertilization could survive being reduced in size to either of two non-overlapping collections of cells. A transitivity of identity puzzle arises when instead of reducing the embryo in size by destroying one or the other of the collection of cells which need not be equal in number - each collection is separated and grown into a distinct human being. The puzzle can be blocked from arising by denying that the early post-fertilization plurality of cells possesses the integration necessary to compose a living embryo. Or it could be resolved by accepting either bare identities, a closest continuer account of identity, or the four-dimensional co-location account. We instead argue that there are good biological reasons to deny that an early embryo could ever be reduced to a size that would generate the transitivity puzzle. Papers in Progress Will Artificial Wombs End the Abortion Debate? If the reason abortion is justified is just that women have a right to refuse to allow the fetus to use their bodies, then artificial wombs that make every embryo viable will render such a justification moot. Assuming the removal for incubation isnt more painful, time consuming or painful than abortion, then a right to control ones body would no longer justify abortion as there is no right to guarantee the death of the child, just its removal which may involve or result in its death prior to viability. But such Thomson-inspired defenses of abortion may have been merely a sufficient condition for the permissibility of abortion or, as McMahan argues, not even the best justification on offer. It may be argued that the mindless fetus cant be harmed and the minimally minded fetus cannot be significantly harmed by abortion. The harms may be so insubstantial and the moral status of the fetus so inconsequential that the preservation of its life doesnt justify the costs of high-tech incubation or prohibit its use as a source of vital organs (McMahan). Or some women may abort early in their pregnancies because they fear that if they dont they will then become too attached to the fetus or newborn to give it up. Olivia Little has sought to justify abortion on the basis that one doesnt have a duty enter into an intimate relationship with ones fetus that one cant easily or morally leave after it has been sustained. I argue that McMahan and Littles defenses would also permit infanticide and the reasons that make the latter impermissible also make abortion unjustified. Generic Health Generic Health is the name for a species-independent conception of health. The idea is that all living organisms, regardless of species, must perform certain generic biological functions to remain alive. The generic requirements of health are determinables that will be made determinate in different ways by different kinds of organisms. When such organisms suffer a sufficient decline or failure to so function, they will be more likely to die and can be classified as pathological. Generic Health is a partial conception of health that needs to be complemented by a more complex, species-specific, and historically sensitive theory like that of Wakefield or Boorse. Nevertheless, it has explanatory powers that are lacking in those and other theories of health and disease that take the species as the reference class. Such approaches will be committed to the bizarre consequence that some organisms will die without being unhealthy. Generic Health can avoid this. It can classify as healthy or pathological those organisms that dont belong determinately to any species. It can recognize pathologies in those first organisms that lacked living ancestors and perhaps didnt even leave descendants. Generic Health can demarcate healthy functions and unhealthy malfunctions if the species notion is pluralist or fails to refer. It can determine functions even if the natural selection adapationist program is deeply flawed. The theory can also recognize universal diseases and can provide grounds for considering declining abilities that are typical of aging to be pathological. Books in Progress The Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics 164,540 Words. The book contains chapters on each of the major metaphysical accounts of personal identity and draws out the theorys implications for when we come into and go out of existence. It then shows how such metaphysical accounts can provide support or obstacles for opposing moral positions regarding beginning and end of life issues such as abortion, embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, genetic interventions, physician-assisted suicide, advanced directives and organ procurement. After a lengthy first chapter introducing the issues, terminology, and methodology, there are chapters on Animalist, Hylomorphic, Cartesian, Constitution, Neo-Lockean, Four-Dimensionalist, and Brain accounts of personal identity. Each chapter includes discussions about when the particular theory posits that someone comes into and goes out of existence, whether it is possible for a harm (or a harmless wrong) to occur at the time of the medical procedure in question, whether the problem of too many minds makes informed consent unlikely or even impossible, and how well the approach in question fares as a general theory of personal identity. Health, Harm and Potential: A Philosophical Analysis of the Abortion Debate with Rose Hershenov 130,353 Words. We defend the view that health is the key to the moral status of fetus. We contend that all living beings, minded and minimally minded, have an interest in their heathy development. Since healthy human beings can obtain levels of well-being unmatched by other creatures, they can suffer great harms when their healthy development is thwarted. Positing an interest of the mindless in their healthy development enables our account to avoid the standard reductios of the moral significance of potential. Since non-humans are not unhealthy when they dont develop into persons, they dont have an interest frustrated by any potential for personhood being left unfulfilled. We argue that our account of moral status can do a better job than McMahan and Marquiss accounts explaining harms to the mindless and minimally minded. McMahan underestimates the harms and Marquis overestimates them. While we argue that we originate at fertilization, we claim abortion is wrong even if we have later origins. There is an early embryonic organism that is harmed by abortion even if we are not identical to it. After discussing the relationship between harm and moral status, we argue the mindless and minimally minded human beings cannot be justly killed to avoid Thomson-style burdens. We also claim, contrary to a widely held assumption, that there is common ground between abortion foes and abortions defenders and that lies in the rejection of infanticide. We then show that the standard arguments for abortion entail infanticide. So if infanticide is unjustifiable, then abortion is also unjustified. We next defend the incoherence of the position of being personally opposed but politically tolerant of abortion. We end with a discussion of why it is immoral to use violence to prevent the wrongfully killing of innocent fetuses. Keynote Addresses and Named Lectures 1. The Possibility of Resurrection Albert the Great Lecture. Niagara Ҵý. May 2, 2007. 2. Is the Soul the Sole Solution? Keynote address at Ҵý of California, Santa Barbara Department of Philosophy and Department of Religious Studies Graduate Student Conference Personhood, Place, and Possession: Embodiment and Emplacement in Special Contexts May 28-29, 2013. Santa Barbara, California 3. Hylomorhism and the Problem of Too Many Thinkers Keynote Address at Biola Ҵý Graduate Student Conference. November 2, 2013 Biola Ҵý, Los Angeles, California Presentations 1. Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection. Ҵý of California at Santa Barbara Philosophy Club. Santa Barbara, California. November 13, 2001. 2. Personal Identity and Bioethics. Ҵý of Buffalo. Buffalo, New York. December 2002. 3. Personal Identity and Bioethics. Ҵý of Delaware Philosophy Department Colloquium. Newark, Delaware. January 2002. 4. The Subject of Thought. Ҵý Workshop on Intentionality and its Biological Foundations. Buffalo, New York. February 1, 2003. 5. Organisms, Artifacts and Eliminativism. Ҵý Philosophy Colloquium. Buffalo, New York. September 5, 2002. 6. The Definition of Death. Ҵý Metaphysics of Medicine Conference. Buffalo, New York. November 13, 2004. 7. Personal Identity and Purgatory. Selves, Souls and Survival Conference. Society for Christian Philosophers Pacific Regional Meeting. Ҵý of San Diego. February 16-18, 2006. (Commentator: Aaron Schiller.) San Diego, California. 8. Shoemakers Problem of Too Many Thinkers. American Catholic Philosophical Association 2006 Annual Meeting. Denison Ҵý, October, 27-29, 2006. (Commentator: Jason Eberl.) Grandville, Ohio. 9. A More Palatable Epicureanism. Creighton Club. Hobart College. November 4, 2006. (Commentator: Ben Bradley.) Geneva, New York 10. Why Consent may not be needed for Organ Procurement. American Medical Students Association. Ҵý Medical School. April 24, 2007. Co-delivered with J. Delaney. Invited. Buffalo, New York. 11. The Possibility of Resurrection, Albert the Great Lecture. Niagara Ҵý. May 2, 2007. Lewiston, New York. 12. Organisms, Brains and their Parts. Ҵý Philosophy of Biology Workshop. September 29, 2007. Buffalo, New York. 13. Hylomorphism and Personal Identity Thought Experiments. Western New York and Western Pennsylvania Regional Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Canisius College, November 17, 2007. Buffalo, New York. 14. Mandatory Autopsies and Organ Conscription, Association for Practical and Professional Ethics. Seventeenth Annual Meeting. February 21-24, 2008. San Antonio, Texas. 15. Organisms, Persons and Bioethics I. American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on Persons, Human Organisms and Bioethics. Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. March 18-23, 2008. Panel Commentators: Mayra Schectman, David Shoemaker, Mary Anne Warren, John Lizz (chair). 16. Organisms, Persons and Bioethics II Creighton Club. Hobart and William Smith Colleges.. October 18, 2008. (Commentator: Ben Bradley). Geneva, New York 17. The Metaphysical Basis of a More Liberal Organ Procurement Policy. Wake Forest Ҵý Bioethics Center Search Committee. December 8, 2008. Wake Forest, North Carolina. 18. Animals, Persons and Bioethics. Wake Forest Ҵý Philosophy Department, Wake Forest, North Carolina, December 9, 2008 19. A Justification for Organ Conscription with James Delaney. Center for Thomistic Studies. Ethics of Organ Transplantation Conference. Ҵý of Saint Thomas, March 27-29. Paper delivered by co-author Jim Delaney. Houston, Texas. 20. The Im Personally Opposed to Abortion ButArgument. With Rose Hershenov, Western New York and Western Pennsylvania Regional Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Canisius College. May 1, 2009. Buffalo, New York. 21. Soulless Organisms? Animalism vs. Hylomorphism. American Catholic Philosophical Association Annual Meeting. Satellite Session of the Society for Catholicism and Analytical Philosophy. November 14, 2009. Novermbe14, 2009. (Commentator Jason Eberl). New Orleans, Louisiana. 22 Animals, Persons and Bioethics. Ҵý of California at Santa Barbara. Fall 2009. Santa Barbara, California. 23. The Im Personally Opposed to Abortion ButArgument. (with Rose Hershenov). American Catholic Philosophical Association. November 13-14, 2009. New Orleans, Louisiana. 24. A Comparison of Hylomorphic and Animalist Conceptions of the Afterlife. Western New York and Northwest Pennsylvania Regional Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. April 17, 2010, Canisius College. Buffalo, New York 25. Embryos, Temporal Parts and Moral Status, Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology March 13, 2011. New Orleans, Louisiana. 26. Perdure and Murder. American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on Potentiality American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011. Minneapolis, Minnesota. 27. Perdure and Murder. UB Lunchtime Philosophy Talks. Park Hall 141. Ҵý. April 29, 2011. Buffalo, New York. 28. Dualism, Panpsychism and the Bioethical Status of the Brainless UB Lunchtime Philosophy Talks. Park Hall 141. Ҵý. November 11, 2011. Buffalo, New York 29. How to Argue the Pro-Choice Position on Abortion Presentation to the UB undergraduate Philosophy Club. April 18, 2012 30. Morally Relevant Potential with Rose Hershenov. New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association, Bergen Community College, November 10, 2012. Lyndhurst New Jersey, 31. Split Brains: No Headache for the Soul Theorist. With Adam Taylor. Western New York American Catholic Philosophical Association. Canisius College, November 17, 2012. Buffalo New York. 32 Morally Relevant Potential. South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference. Charleston College, March 8-9, 2013. Charleston, South Carolina 34. Protecting Persons from Animal Bites UMass Amherst Retirement Conference in honor of Lynne Rudder Baker on April 20, 2013. Amherst, Massachusetts. 35. Is the Soul the Sole Solution? Keynote address at Ҵý of California, Santa Barbara Department of Philosophy and Department of Religious Studies Graduate Student Conference Personhood, Place, and Possession: Embodiment and Emplacement in Special Contexts May 28-29, 2013 Santa Barbara, California. 36. Healthy Development and the Potential that Matters. Platos Academy, North Tonawanda Conference (PANTC) Conference. Ҵý, Paper sent to conference participants. Due to time constraints, a different paper was delivered Morally Relevant Potential. Buffalo New York. August 2-3, 2013. 37. Is the Soul the Sole Solution? Society for Christian Philosophys Eastern Division Conference. Ҵý of South Florida, October 24-26. 2013. Tampa Florida. 38. Hylomorphism and the Problem of Too Many Thinkers Keynote Address, Biola Ҵý Graduate Student Conference. November 2, 2013 Biola Ҵý, Los Angeles, California 39. The Costs of a Materialist Account of Mind Southern Society of Psychology and Philosophy Conference Feb 6-8, 2014 Charleston College. Charleston, South Carolina. 41. Anscombe on Embryos and Persons with Rose Hershenov, Anscombe: Contributions to the Catholic Intellectual Tradition Conference, Neuman Ҵý, March 15, 2014, Aston Pa. 42. Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy SUNY Fredonia Philosophy Colloquium. Wednesday April 2, 2014. Fredonia, New York 43. Morally Relevant Potential with Rose Hershenov. 8th Felician College Ethics Conference. April 26, 2014. Rutherford, New York. 44. Health, Harm and Potential. With Rose Hershenov, UB Clinical/Research Ethics Center June 17, 2014. Buffalo, NY. 45. Health, Harm and Potential with Rose Hershenov, Platos Academy, North Tonawanda Conference (PANTC) Conference. Ҵý, August 1-2, 2014. Buffalo, New York 46. Freedom and Identity (delivered by co-author Adam Taylor). Annual Meeting of The Minnesota Philosophical Society. at the Ҵý of Minnesota at Duluth. Duluth, Minnesota. Oct. 3, 2014. 47. Autonomy and Identity (delivered by co-author Adam Taylor) Midwest Conference on Philosophy. Northwestern Ҵý November 9, 2014. Evanston, Illinois. 48. Health, Harm and Potential with Rose Hershenov. Annual Virginia Philosophical Association Conference. October 7, 2014 Washington and Lee Ҵý. Lexington, Virginia 49. Freedom and Identity (delivered by co-author Adam Taylor) Free Will Conference, November 10, 2015. Flint Michigan, 50. Death and Dignity Anscombe Forum: Human Dignity. Neumann Ҵý, March 13, 2015. Alston, Pennsylvania. 51, Generic Health Platos Academy, North Tonawanda Campus (PANTC) Conference. July 30-August 1 2015. Ҵý, Buffalo, NY 52. Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy Blameless Buffalo? Conference June 26-27 2015. Ҵý, Buffalo New York 53. Can the Secular be Autonomous? Presented. Delivered by co-author Adam Taylor at the June 26-27 2015 Blameless Buffalo? Conference, Buffalo New York 54. Why Materialists are Committed to Perversion with Adam Taylor. Lighthearted Philosophers Association. October 9-10 2015, Deerfield Beach, Florida. 55. The Potential of Potentiality Arguments with Rose Hershenov. 2015 Creighton Club Meeting. Syracuse Ҵý. November 7, 2015. Syracuse, New York, 56. Health, Harm and Potential. Southwestern Philosophical Society. November 6-8, 2015. Nashville Tennessee 57. What Are We? An Online Panel Discussion of the Nature of the Human Person. November 16, 2015 6:00-8:00 pm. Joel Potter, Adam Taylor and Mark Spencer. 58. Death and Dignity Clinical Research and Ethics Seminar. Buffalo General Hospital. February 26, 2016. Buffalo, New York 59. Death, Persons and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers delivered at the American Philosophical Association Central March 3, 2016 Chicago, Illinois 60. Owners and Donors The Ethics of Bodily Commodification Conference. The College of New Jersey, April 2, 2016. Ewing, New Jersey. 61. Should Steve Kershnar be Given Hemlock for Corrupting the Pro-Life Young with Phil Reed. Regents Lecture. Ҵý. May 13, 2016 62. Death and Dignity. Philosophical Issues at the End of Life. 26th Annual Conference of the Ҵý Faculty for Life. Marquette Ҵý. Milwaukee, WI. June 10-11, 2016 63. Is Health the Key to Autonomy? Blameless Buffalo? Conference. Ҵý, June 18. 2016. Buffalo, New York. 64. Generic Health, Moral Status and a Moderate Speciesism. Platos Academy, North Tonawanda Campus (PANTC) Conference. July 31, 2016. Buffalo, NY. 65. Personal Identity and the Possibility of Informed Consent Franciscan Ҵý Bioethics Center. October 12. 2017. Steubenville Ohio. 66. Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Abortion. Franciscan Ҵý. A talk presented to Patrick Lees graduate seminar on Law and Abortion. October 12, 2016. Steubenville, Ohio 67. The Moment you Dies and Cease to Exist. Ҵý of Kutztown Philosophy Department Colloquium. Kutztown Ҵý. May 4, 2017. Kutztown Pa. 68. Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Abortion. Kutztown Ҵý, Kutztown Philosophy Cub talk. May 4, 2017. Kutztown Pa. 69. Compatibilism, Fairness and Hell. Blameless Buffalo? Reading Group Conference. Ҵý. May 20. 2017. Buffalo, New York 70. Why Even Non-Pacifist Pro-Lifers Shouldnt Kill Abortion Doctors. With Phil Reed. Ҵý Faculty for Life, St. Thomas Ҵý Law School. Minneapolis, Minnesota. June 8-9, 2017 . 71. Identity, Totipotency and Transitivity. With Rose Hershenov. Romanell/PANTC Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Conference. July 29, 2017. Buffalo, New York 72. Why I am a Meat Eating Vegetarian. Lighthearted Philosophers Conference. Sept 29-30, 2017. Saint Petersburg Florida. 73. Are Psychological Accounts of Personal Identity Compatible with the Whole-Brain Dead Criterion? Romanell Center for Clinical ethics and Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. November 18, 2017. Buffalo New York 74. Are Psychological Accounts of Personal Identity Compatible with the Whole-Brain Dead Criterion? Brain Death: New Questions for Philosophy and Theology Conference. Georgetown Ҵý. December 1, 2017. Washington DC. 75. Totipotency, Morality, and Modality Symposium on Personal Identity and Origins. American Philosophical Association. (APA) Eastern January 3-6, 2018. Savannah, Georgia. 76. Is Hell Fair? Seton Hall Philosophy Club Talk. Seton Hall Ҵý. South Orange, New Jersey February 12, 2018 77. Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Harm to Embryos Central American Philosophical Association (APA) Winter Conference Main Program. Palmer Hotel. Chicago, Ill. February 21-24, 2017 78. If Fetuses are Parts of their Mothers, then Three Popular Defenses of Abortion Fail. 28th Annual Life and Learning Conference. Ҵý of Dallas. Dallas, Texas. June 8-9, 2018 79. Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Harm to Embryos Bioethics and Personal Identity Conference. Ҵý Duiseburg-Essen, June 14-15. Essen, Germany. 80. If Fetuses are Parts of their Mothers, then Three Popular Defenses of Abortion Fail on Merely Conceptual Grounds. Romanell Center/Pantc Conference. Ҵý. July 26, 2018 81. Do Division Puzzles Provide a Reason to Doubt that our Organism was ever a Zygote. Governors Lecture. Ҵý. Buffalo, New York September 7, 2018, 82. If Fetuses are Parts of their Mothers, then Three Popular Defenses of Abortion Fail on Merely Conceptual Grounds. Alabama Philosophical Society. September 28, 2018. Pensacola, Florida 83. Conscientious Objection or an Internal Morality of Medicine? Ostapenko Center for Ethics in Medicine and Healthcare Symposium: The Doctor-Patient Relationship: Does Christianity Make a Difference? Niagara Ҵý, October 5-6, 2018 84. The Metaphysical Mistake Underlying Tooleys Defense of Infanticide Romanell Center Workshop Panel. Ҵý. Buffalo, NY. October 27, 2018. 85. What Do Embryo Rescue Scenarios Reveal about the Moral Status of the Unborn? Romanell Center Workshop Panel. Ҵý. Buffalo, NY. October 27, 2018. 86. What Do Embryo Rescue Scenarios Reveal about the Moral Status of the Unborn? Satellite Session, American Catholic Philosophical Association Annual Meeting. San Diego, California. November 9. 2018 88. Do Division Puzzles Provide a Reason to Doubt that our Organism was ever a Zygote. Personal Identity and our Origins Panel. American Philosophical Association Central Meeting. Denver, Colorado. February 21-23, 2019. 87. The Moment You Die and Cease to Exist Buffalo Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. February 2, 2019 88. Do Division Puzzles Provide a Reason to Doubt that our Organism was ever a Zygote? American Philosophical Association Conference - Central Division Meeting, Denver, Colorado. February 23, 2019. 89. Harming the Mindless: Modifying McMahans Time Relative Interests Account Western New York Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. Buffalo, New York. March 2, 2019 90. Why You cant be Uploaded, Transplanted, or Teletransported. Ostepenko Ethics Center Conference Niagara Ҵý. Lewiston, New York. April 6, 2019. 91. A Naturalist Response to Kingmas Critique of Naturalism National Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. Buffalo, New York April, 13, 2019 92 Professional Refusals, Social Justice, and a Pathocentric Internal Morality of Medicine, Academy for Professional in Health Care Conference. Jung Hotel. New Orleans, Louisiana May 15-17 93. If Pro-Lifers Believe that Embryos are Persons then why dont they Demand a Massive Redistribution of Research Dollars to Miscarriage Prevention? International Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine. Romanell Center. Ҵý. Buffalo, NY. May 11, 2019 94. What Do Embryo Rescue Scenarios Reveal about the Moral Status of the Unborn? Ҵý Faculty for Life. June 6-7 2019 Mundelein Seminary/Ҵý of St. Mary of the Lake. Mundelein, Illinois 95. A Philosopher Asks: Can You Become a Robot? Nickel City Forum. June 20, 2019. Thin Many Brewery. Buffalo, New York 96. Thinking Animals or Thinking Brains? 7th Annual Romanell Center Conference (PANTC) Buffalo New York July 25-28, 2019 97. The Im Personally to Abortion butArgument Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. Ҵý. September 28, 2019. 98. An Alternative to the Pro-Life Rational Substance View. Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. Ҵý. October 26, 2019 99. Do Medical Professionals Have a Right of Conscientious Objection? Nickel City Forum. Buffalo New York. November 19, 2019 100. Identity, Integration, and Transitivity: A Puzzle about the Existence of the Early Embryo Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. Ҵý. February 15, 2020. 101. Bioethics and Hybrid Theories of Personal Identity. Romanell Center September Workshop, Ҵý. Buffalo, New York. March 14, 2020. 102. An Alternative to the Rational Substance Pro-Live View. Fr. Robert J. Henle, SJ Conference. Saint Louis Ҵý Workshop. March 29-30, 2020. 103. The Impossibility of Self Ownership Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. Ҵý. April 25, 2020. 104 Some Conceptual Problems with the Mere Difference View of Disability Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Workshop. Ҵý. May 23, 2020 105. If Pro-Lifers Believe that Embryos are Persons then why dont they Demand a Massive Redistribution of Research Dollars to Miscarriage Prevention? Saint Johns Ҵý. Ҵý Faculty for Life Annual Conference. June, 2020 106. Defining Addiction without an Appeal to Autonomy 8th Annual Romanell Conference , Buffalo New York July 30-August 1, 2020. Invited Commentaries 1. Comments on David Shoemakers Whats Identity Got to do with It? Pacific APA, March 19, 2008. Pasadena, California 2. Comments on Mayra Schectmans Persons and the Practical. Panel on Organisms, Persons and Bioethics. Pacific APA, March 19, 2008 Pasadena, California. 3. Comments on Jason EberlsThe Unactualized Potential of PVS Patients. American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on Potentiality American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota 4. Comments on Mary Anne Warren. Pacific APA What Would Kant Have Said about Abortion and Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and Why Does It Matter? APA. Panel on Organisms, Persons and Bioethics. March 19, 2008. Pasadena, California. 5. Comments on Bertha Alvarez Mettinens Why Fetal Potential Matters American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on Potentiality American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota 6. Comments on John Lizzas Potential, Possibility and Ethical Relevance. American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on Potentiality American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota 7. Comments on Allison Thornton, Surviving Death as Immaterial Animals. Society of Christian Philosophy satellite of American Catholic Philosophical Association annual conference, Washington DC. November 11, 2014 8. Comments on John Lizzas paper, Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. APA March 3, 2016. Chicago, Illinois 9. Comments on Don Marquiss paper. Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association March 3, 2016 Chicago Illinois, 10. Comments on Mayra Schechtmans paper. Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. March 3, 2016. Chicago, Illinois. 11. Comments on Rivka Weinbergs You only Die Once International Association for the Philosophy of Death and Dying. May 19, 2016 Syracuse, New York. Talks to Non-Academic Audiences Do Medical Professionals Have a Right of Conscientious Objection? Nickel City Forum. Buffalo New York. November 19, 2019 A Philosopher Asks: Can You Become a Robot? Nickel City Forum. June 20, 2019. Thin Many Brewery. Buffalo, New York How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments at St. Theresas Roman Catholic Church in Buffalo, NY March 21, 2012 How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments at St John the Baptist Roman Catholic Church in Kenmore, New York on May 24, 2012 Graduate Student Publications Prepared Under my Supervision Clint Dowland: Embodied Mind Sparsism Philosophical Studies 2016, 173:7, 1853-1872 Adam Taylor: The Frustrating Problem for Four-Dimensionalism, Philosophical Studies (2013) 165, 10971115 Jake Monaghan: Biological Ties and Biological Accounts of Moral Status,"The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (forthcoming) Matt LaVine: "Prior's Thank-Goodness Argument Reconsidered." Synthese, 2016 193: 35913606 John Beverly. The Ties that UndermineBioethics 2016 30:5, 304-311. Stephen McAndrew Internal Morality of Medicine and Physician Autonomy Journal of Medical Ethics 2019 Mark Spencer: A Reexamination of the Hylomorphic Theory of Death The Review of Metaphysics, 63:4 2010, 843-870 David Limbaugh: 2019. The Harm of Medical Disorder as Harm in the Damage Sense Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40:1, 1-19. David Limbaugh: "Animals, Advance Directives and Prudence: Should We Let the Cheerfully Demented Die?" Ethics, Medicine and Public Health, 2016. 2:4. 481-489 Peter Koch An Alternative to An Alternative to Brain Death American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings: 2009, 83, 89-98. Rose Koch. Totipotency, Twinning and Ensoulment. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 31:2, 2006, 139-164 Rose Koch. Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity. The Monist. 89:3. 2006, 351-370. Professional Service Co-Founder and monthly organizer of the Vienna Circle: Cheektowaga Chapter. Western New York Metaphysics Reading Group 2011-2014 Co-Founder and monthly organizer of Blameless Buffalo? Free will and moral responsibility Western New York reading group 2014 until Spring 2018. Co-Founder and monthly organizer of PANTC/Romanell Center Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Western New York Reading Group. 2012 to present External Reviewer- East Carolina Ҵý Philosophy Department February 23-24, 2012 Refereeing for the following Peer Reviewed Journals and Presses: Analysis (2x) American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (2x) American Philosophical Quarterly Australasian Journal of Philosophy (8x) Bioethics 2x Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review Erkenntnis (4x) Social Theory and Practice (5x) Canadian Journal of Philosophy (4x) Journal of Ethics (2x) Journal of Social Philosophy Journal of Philosophy Journal of Moral Philosophy 3x Journal of Medical Ethics (4x) Journal of Philosophical Research (2x) Mind (6x) Mind and Machines The Monist (27x) Neuroethics Philosophia (4x) Philosophical Papers (2x) Philosophical Quarterly (3x) Philosophical Studies (3x) Public Affairs Quarterly (9x) Religious Studies Southern Journal of Philosophy (2x) Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Science Synthese The Philosophical Quarterly (4x) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (3x) Press Referee (Book length manuscripts) Oxford Ҵý Press (5x) Editorial Work Guest Editor of The Monist, Coming Into Being and Passing Away. 98:3, July 2006. Guest co-Editor (with Randy Dipert) of The Monist. Composition and Constitution. 96:1, Jan. 2013. Conferences Organized Co-organizer (with Barry Smith) of Metaphysics of Medicine Conference. Ҵý. November 13-14, 2004. Co-organizer (with Randall Dipert and Barry Smith) The Philosophy of E.J. Lowe. Ҵý. April 7-9, 2006. Co-organizer (with Randall Dipert) The Philosophy of Lynne Baker: The Metaphysics of Everyday Life. Ҵý. April 24-25, 2009. Ist Annual Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference. Ҵý, August 2-3, 2013. Keynoter John Martin Fischer 2nd Annual Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference. Buffalo, New York. August 1-2, 2014. Keynoter Christopher Boorse Blameless Buffalo? Conference on free will and moral responsibility. Keynoter John Fischer. Buffalo New York June 26-27, 2015 3rd Annual Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Conference 2015. Ҵý, July30-August 1, 2015 Keynoters Jerry Wakefield and Chris Boorse Blameless Buffalo Conference on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Keynoter Steve Kershnar, Plenary Speaker John Keller. Buffalo, New York. June 18, 2016. 4th Annual Romanell Center of Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference: Keynoters David Boonin and Elselijn Kingma. July 28-31. 2016. Buffalo, New York Blameless Buffalo? Conference on Free will and Moral Responsibility. Ҵý. Buffalo, New York.; May 20, 2017 5th Annual Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference: Keynoters Don Marquis, John Lizza, and Mayra Schechtman. July 28-30. 2017 Buffalo, New York 6th Annual Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference. July 26-29, 2018. Keynoter Jerome Wakefield. 7th Annual Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference. July 25-29, 2019. Keynoter, John Martin Fischer 8th Annual Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference. Juley 30-August 1, 2020. Keynoter Christopher Boorse Workshops and Panels Organized October 2017 Romanell Center Workshop in Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine February 2018 Romanell Center Workshop in Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine March 2018 Romanell Center Workshop in Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine October 27, 2018. Romanell Center Workshop Panel. Ҵý. Buffalo, NY. November 9, 2018 What Do Embryo Rescue Scenarios Reveal about the Moral Status of the Unborn? Dr. David Hershenov, Dr. James Delaney, Dr. Steve Kershnar. Satellite Session, American Catholic Philosophical Association Annual Meeting. San Diego, California. February 2, 2019 Buffalo Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine March 2, 2019 Western New York Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine April 13, 2019 US National Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine May 11, 2019 International Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine September 28. 2019. Romanell Center Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine October 26, 2019. Romanell Center Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine. November 26, 2019. Themes from Wear: Workshop in Honor of the Retirement of Stephen Wear. November 22 American Catholic Philosophical Association Panel Can Abortion Guarantee Innocent Fetuses Go to Heaven? Dr. Steve Kershnar, Dr. Jason Eberl, Dr. Chris Kaczor. Minneapolis, Minnesota February15, 2020. Romanell Center Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Romanell Center Workshop. March 14, 2020. Romanell Center Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine April 25, 2020. Romanell Center Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine May 23, 2020. Romanell Center Workshop on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Debates Organized Should Physician-Assisted Suicide Be Legalized - Round II Dr. Phil Reed vs. Dr. Steve Kershnar. Ҵý, July 30, 2020. Should Physician-Assisted Suicide be Legalized? Dr. Steve Kershnar vs. Dr. Phil Reed. Ҵý. October 16, 2019 What Survives Death: The Person or the Soul? David Oderberg v. Patrick Toner. Ҵý. September 26, 2013 Is Abortion Ethical? Catherine Nolan vs. Steve Kershnar. Ҵý. March 5, 2014. Does the Soul Exist David Limbaugh, Jon Houston, Shane Hemmer vs. Brian Donahue, Steven McAndrew, Justin Murray. Ҵý. March 5, 2015 Does the Existence of Evil Show that God does not exist? David Limbaugh vs. Neil Otte. Ҵý. April 16, 2015 Do we have Free will and are we Morally Responsible? John Keller vs. Steve Kershnar. Ҵý. October 22, 2015 Does Evolution undermine Moral Realism? Jake Monaghan vs. Brendan Cline. Ҵý. Fall 2015 Debate Participant Internet debate on Personal Identity sponsored by Dr. Joel Potter of the Ҵý of Alaska Philosophy Department. 11/16/16 Debate on Abortion with Catherine Nolan, Christian Andzel, Ken Ehrenberg et al, sponsored by UB Pro Life club and UB Philosophy Department Club. 4/5/12 Lectures Organized Founded and Organized Weekly Department Regent Lectures from Fall 2011 to Spring 2016 Founded and Organized Weekly Romanell Center Governors Lectures from Winter 2018 to Present Teaching Graduate Seminars Contemporary Controversies in Bioethics The Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics Life and Death Philosophy of Medicine: Theory and Practice The Soul Bioethics The Subject of Thought Philosophy of Science Evolution and Epistemology Personal Identity Teaching Philosophy The Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics First Year Intensive Writing Seminar Teaching Bioethics (One day workshop for graduate instructors that I have taught 8 times) Intensive Writing Seminar for First Year Graduate Students Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics UB Ontology Workshop July 2009 Undergraduate Courses Bioethics Philosophy of Medicine Introduction to Philosophy Philosophy of Law Introductory Ethics Business and Professional Ethics Advanced Ethical Theory Early Modern Philosophy Ancient Philosophy Critical Thinking Metaphysics Summer Teaching (6 week intensive sessions.) 2003- Social and Ethical Values in Medicine 2004 - Introduction to Philosophy; Social and Ethical Values in Medicine 2005 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine 2006 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine 2007 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine 2008 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine 2009 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine; Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics Independent Studies Directed Independent Graduate Study in Personal Identity (Mark Niswonger) Spring 2004 Independent Undergraduate Study in Bioethics (Melanie Arison) Spring 2003 Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Ryan Kohl) Fall 2002 Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Andrea Ott) Fall 2204 Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Elisa Ruhl) Fall 2004 Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Todd Bindig) Fall 2004 Independent Graduate Study in the Foundations of Bioethics (Steve Halady) Fall 2007 Independent Graduate Study in Catholic Bioethics (Mark Spencer) Fall 2008 Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Peter Koch) Fall 2008 Independent Graduate Study in the Foundation of Bioethics (Adam Taylor) Fall 2008 Independent Graduate Study in The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death (Peter Koch) Spring 2009 Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Yuichi Minemura) Fall 2010 Independent Undergraduate Honors Course in the Badness of Death (Brendon Bochacki) Fall 2010 Independent Graduate Study in Christian Philosophy (Peter Koch) Spring 2011 Independent Graduate Study in Christian Philosophy (Catherine Nolan) Fall 2011 Independent Graduate Study in Christian Philosophy (David Hahn) Fall 2011 Independent Graduate Study in the Philosophy of Mind (Catherine Nolan) Spring 2012 Independent Graduate Study in Metaphysics (Clint Dowland) Spring 2013 Independent Graduate Study in the Philosophy of Medicine (Catherine Nolan) Spring 2013 Independent Undergraduate Study on hylomorphism and bioethics (Katherine Boniello) Fall 2015 Independent Graduate Study in Free will and Moral Responsibility (David Limbaugh) Spring 2016 Independent Graduate Study on Manipulation Cases and Responsibility (Robert Kelly) Spring 2016 Independent Study on Mental Health and Physician Assisted Suicide. (Michael Fiorica) Spring 2018 Independent Graduate Study on Soul Theories, (Ryan Kulsea), Spring 2019 Independent Study on the Philosophy of Medicine. (Alexandra Wadhwani). Spring 2019 Reading Groups Directed Led two Fall 2002 Bioethics Reading Groups - Jeff McMahans Ethics of Killings at the Margins of Life Led Spring 2003 Bioethics Reading Group - Daniel Brock, Allen Buchanan, Norman Daniels, Daniel Wiklers Genetics and Justice: From Chance to Choice. Led Summer First Session 2004 Bioethics Reading Group - H. Tristram Englehardts The Foundations of Bioethics Led Summer Second Session 2004 Bioethics Reading Group - H. Tristram Englehardts The Foundations of Christian Bioethics UB Faculty Metaphysics and Epistemology Reading Group. 2006-2007 WNY faculty reading group on John Fischers My Way Summer 2008 WNY faculty reading group on David Vellemans Hourani Lectures Winter 2010-201 WNY Faculty reading group preparing for Oderbergs Hourani 2013 Lectures Vienna Circle, Cheektowaga Chapter. Faculty Metaphysics Reading Group Fall 2010 to Fall 2012 Platos Academy, North Tonawanda Campus. Faculty/Grad Bioethics Reading Group Summer 2011 to present Blameless Buffalo? Faculty/Grad Free will & Moral Responsibility Reading group. Fall 2013 to Spring 2018 Graduate Student Dissertation Committees Chaired Rose Koch (Defended August 2005) Larry Torcello (Defended April 2006) Mark Ninswonger (chair from 2006-2009) Todd Bindig (Defended May 2006) Andrea Ott (Defended May 2010) Adam Taylor (Defended September 2014) Yuichi Minemura (Defended September 2017) Catherine Nolan (Defended Summer 2015) Clint Dowland (Defended, Fall 2018 Robert Kelly (ongoing) Masters Theses Nick Lane (Spring 2005) Chris Barlow (Spring 2005) Alisa Wandzilak (Summer 2007) Krystyl Newell (Spring 2011) Membership Philosophical Associations American Philosophical Association Creighton Club: The New York State Philosophical Association Ҵý Faculty for Life American Catholic Philosophical Association Department Committee Work 2002-2003 Progress and Evaluation Committee Library Committee Qualifying Examinations Committee 2003-2004 Placement Officer Committee (chair) Colloquium Committee (chair) Search Committee Executive Committee Graduate Examinations Grader 2004-2005 Admissions Committee Graduate Examinations Committee Executive Committee 2005-2006 Admissions Committee Library Committee Graduate Student Teaching Award Committee Romanell Chair (Lowe) Committee 2006-2007 Placement Committee Library Committee Progress and Evaluation Committee 2007-2008 Director of Graduate Studies Executive Committee Admissions (Chair) Placement Committee Library Committee Course Committee Bioethics 2008-2009 Director of Graduate Studies Executive Committee Curriculum Committee Admissions Committee Progress and Evaluation Committee Placement Committee Course Committee - Bioethics Graduate Affairs Committee Hourani Lectures (John Fischer) Organizer 2009-2010 Director of Graduate Studies Curriculum Committee Admissions Committee Progress and Evaluation Committee Placement Committee Course Committee - Bioethics Graduate Affairs Committee 2010-2011 Chair of Department 2011-2012 Chair of Department Search Committee for Early Modern Philosophy Gender Committee Organizer of Friday Lunchtime Philosophy Department Talks Editor of the NousLetter (Department magazine for alumni) 2012-2013 Chair of Department Editor of the NousLetter (Department magazine for alumni) Organizer of Friday Lunchtime Philosophy Department Talks 2013-2014 Chair of Department Editor of the NousLetter (Department magazine for alumni) Organizer of Friday Lunchtime Philosophy Department Talks 2014-2015 Chair of Department Editor of NousLetter Organizer of Weekly Regents Lectures Chair of Political Philosophy Search 2015-2016 Chair of Department Regents Lecturer Organizers Graduate School Dissertation Prize Committee Executive Committee Associate Director Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine 2016-2017 On leave Co-Director of the Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine 2017-2018 Co-Director of the Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Graduate Affairs Committee Teaching Committee Search Committee Chair Applied Ethics 2018-2019 Search Committee Chair Applied Ethics Admissions committee Chair Co-Director Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Public Service Videotape Interview with High School Students at Williamsville North for C-Span project on the Science and Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research - Fall 2007 Delivered talk How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments at St. Theresas Roman Catholic Church March 21, 2012 Delivered talk How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments at St John the Baptist Roman Catholic Church on May 24, 2012 Participated in an abortion debates sponsored by the UB Students for Life and the UB undergraduate Philosophy Club April 5, 2012 Interview on Public Radio August 2015 about Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine reading group and Boorse vs. Wakefield debates at the summer conference Interview on Public Radio August 2017 about Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Reading Group under the topic of Beyond the Echo Chamber Interviewed by Danish Journalism MA students on Cryonics Interviewed by Argentinian Journalist on abortion. Delivered talk Why Transhumanists cant Survive the Death of their Bodies at the Nickle City Forum June 20, 2019. Ҵý Service 2012-2015 Organizer of philosophy department run debates on the existence of God, vegetarianism, abortion, evolution and moral realism, existence of the soul, free will and moral responsibility, biological enhancements Kurtz Lectures. Organizers. Biannual lectures on Naturalism in memory of Paul Kurtz Graduate School Dissertation Prize Committee for Education and Social Sciences. Fall 2015 Co-Director Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine 2016 to Present References 1. Jeff McMahan Whites Professor of Moral Philosophy Ҵý of Oxford Corpus Christi College Oxford OX1 4JF United Kingdom  HYPERLINK "mailto:jeff.mcmahan@philosophy.ox.ac.uk" jeff.mcmahan@philosophy.ox.ac.uk 2. John Martin Fischer Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Ҵý of California at Riverside HMNSS Building, Room 3219 900 Ҵý Avenue Riverside, CA 92521 Phone: (951)-827-3762 email:  HYPERLINK "mailto:john.fischer@ucr.edu" john.fischer@ucr.edu 3. Eric Olson. Department of Philosophy Ҵý of Sheffield 45 Victoria Street Sheffield S3 7QB, UK Tel. +44 (0)114 222 0591  HYPERLINK "mailto:e.olson@sheffield.ac.uk" e.olson@sheffield.ac.uk 4. Patrick Lee. John N. and Jamie D. McAleer Professor of Bioethics Franciscan Ҵý at Steubenville Franciscan Ҵý of Steubenville 1235 Ҵý Boulevard Steubenville, OH 43952 Email  HYPERLINK "mailto:plee512@gmail.com" plee512@gmail.com 5. Barry Smith Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Julian Park Chair 126 Park Hall Ҵý Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 Phone: (716) 650-0075 Email:  HYPERLINK "mailto:phismith@buffalo.edu" phismith@buffalo.edu     PAGE  PAGE 21  "#*+56O~tttitaYNthilIhK%=OJQJhK%=OJQJhYOJQJhilIhv bOJQJhilIhg(OJQJhilIhYOJQJhilIhHyOJQJhK%=hHyOJQJhK%=h5OJQJ\hK%=hHyOJQJ\h$4OJQJ]hilIhHy6OJQJ]hQ hQ OJQJ]hQ OJQJ]h{WOJQJ]hkOJQJ]h?OJQJ]#6O]s# $ 7 8 p   ; $`a$gdUW $^a$gdUW$ ``^``a$gdUW$a$gdUW$a$gd>$a$gdK%=$P^P`a$gdQ   ! 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